Yao's garbled circuit construction is a very fundamental result in cryptography and recent efficiency optimizations have brought it much closer to practice. However these constructions work only for circuits and garbling a RAM program involves the inefficient process of first converting it into a circuit. Towards the goal of avoiding this inefficiency, Lu and Ostrovsky (Eurocrypt 2013) introduced the notion of "garbled RAM" as a method to garble RAM programs directly. It can be seen as a RAM analogue of Yao's garbled circuits such that, the size of the garbled program and the time it takes to create and evaluate it, is proportional only to the running time on the RAM program rather than its circuit size.
INTRODUCTION
As individuals and organizations push massive amounts of personal data and the associated computational demands to the cloud, guaranteeing privacy of this data wile simultaneously enabling easy access to it poses tremendous challenges. Consider the following concrete problem. A client, say Alice, wants to store a large private dataset or database D on an untrusted server, referred to as "the cloud.SSubsequently, Alice wants the cloud to be able to compute and learn the output of arbitrary dynamically chosen private programs P1, P2, . . . on private inputs x1, x2, . . . and the previously stored dataset, which gets updated as these programs are executed. Furthermore, Alice wants to achieve this non-interactively, i.e. by sending just one message for each program/input to the server.
Solutions using Yao's Garbled Circuits or Fully Homomorphic
Encryption. The first feasibility solution for this problem was provided by Yao [Yao82] . However Yao's approach requires that the program be first converted to a circuit -the size of which will need to grow at least with the size of the input. Hence for each program that Alice wants the cloud to compute, it will need to send a message that grows with the size of the database. A potential attempt to mitigate this is to use Fully Homomorphic Encryption, first provided by Gentry [Gen09] . While this reduces the size of Alice's message, the cloud still needs to touch the entire encrypted database. Consequently the work of the cloud still grows with the size of the database. These solutions can be prohibitive for various applications, e.g. for binary search the size of the database can be exponentially larger than execution path of the insecure solution. We note that additionally even in settings where the size of the database is small, generic transformations from RAM programs with running time T result in a circuit of size O(T 3 log T ) [CR73, PF79] , which can be prohibitively inefficient.
Garbled RAMs. Motivated by the above considerations, Lu and Ostrovsky [LO13] introduced the notion of garbled random-access machines (garbled RAMs) as a method to garble RAM programs directly. Garbled RAMs can be seen as a RAM analogue of Yao's garbled circuits, such that the size of the garbled program, the time it takes to create and evaluate it is proportional only to the running time on the RAM pogram (up to poly-logarithmic factors), rather than the size of its circuit representation.
In more detail, we will use the notation P D (x) to denote the execution of some RAM program P on input x with initial memory D. A garbled RAM scheme should provide a mechanism to garble the data D into garbled dataD, the program P into garbled program P and the input x into garbled inputx such that givenD,P and x allows for computing P D (x) and nothing more. Furthermore, up to only poly-logarithmic factors in the running time of the RAM P D (x) and the size of D, we require that the size of garbled datã D is proportional only to the size of data D, the size of the garbled inputx is proportional only to that of x and the size and the evaluation time of the garbled programP is proportional only to the running time of the RAM P D (x). Unfortunately, both the original Lu and Ostrovsky [LO13] construction and its follow up [GHRW14, LO14, GHL + 14] need to make strong computational assumptions for achieving the above described efficiency goals. In particular, the security of the original Lu-Ostrovsky relies on a somewhat complex "circular" assumption involving Yao garbled circuits and PRFs and the Gentry et al. [GHRW14] construction uses identity-based encryption (IBE). Lu and Ostrovsky [LO14] describe an alternative construction based just on one-way functions but that does not meet the above mentioned efficiency goals. Specifically for this solution, the size of the garbled program grows by an additional factor of |D| for a constant > 0, which can be prohibitive for the envisioned applications. These works leave open the following problem.
Can we base security of poly-logarithmically efficient garbled RAMs just on the existence of one-way functions?
Our Results
In this paper we provide the first construction of an efficient garbled RAM that can be based on one-way functions alone, thus making it a suitable replacement for Yao's garbled circuits with the added benefits of being in the RAM model. We state this as our main theorem:
Main Theorem (Informal). Assuming one-way functions, there exists a secure garbled RAM scheme, where the size of the garbled database is |D| · poly(κ), size of the garbled input is |x| · poly(κ) and the size of the garbled program and its evaluation time is T · poly(log T, log |D|, κ) where T is the running time of program P . Here κ is the security parameter.
Our contribution also includes an interesting strengthening of the garbled RAM definition where garbling the database is decoupled from the garbling of the program, and only tied together by the garbling of the input. Our constructions do achieve this stronger definition. We believe this will be of independent interest in various outsourcing computation applications. We provide a motivating example application to the pre-processing model below. Persistent Garbled Database. Just as in previous works, our construction allows for execution of multiple programs on the garbled memory, such that the running time of the client and the server per program is proportional to the RAM runtime of that program. Furthermore the garbled database is persistent in the sense that the modifications made to it by the execution of garbled programs are maintained across different program executions. At the same time an attacker can not execute programs out of order, replay old garbled databases to new programs, or modifying the underlying contents of the garbled database beyond what is dictated by the GRAM evaluation algorithm. Preprocessing Model. A nice feature of our solution is that the online work of a client can be further reduced when preprocessing is allowed. In more detail, consider a setting where in a preprocessing phase the client provides the cloud, not just a garbled database but also a set of garbled programs that she might want to execute in the future. Subsequently during the online phase she can dynamically decide the execution order of her previously garbled programs, and execute them on inputs of her choice. A nice feature of this solution is that the clients online overhead for executing a program reduces just to the size of the private inputs (with a poly(κ) overhead), completely independent of the size of the data and the running time of the programs. Technical this becomes possible because of the decoupling of data garbling from program garbling. Input-specific running time. If one is willing to disclose the exact running time of a specific execution, then the running time of a garbled RAM computation can be made input specific which could be much faster than the worst-case running time. This was first explicitly explored by Goldwasser et al. [GKP + 13] in the context of secure TM computation. This applies to a wide range of algorithms that have a gap between "typical"-case and worst-case time complexity, including randomized algorithms which could have exponential worst-case running time (Las Vegas), or heuristic algorithms that perform well in practice.
In our setting, the client can garble a sequence of generic CPU steps and provide them to the cloud. Later on, the client just needs to provide a short garbled input, which allows the cloud to do the computation in input specific running time. Interestingly this only consumes garbled CPU steps proportional to the input specific running time and the left over CPU steps can be used for executing the next program. In other words the clients overall work will be proportional only to the sum of the input-specific running times of the programs it executes with the server. Output Privacy and Verifiability. We note that if in an application output privacy is desired then we can always make the garbled program perform an extra step of encrypting or authenticating the intended output before actually outputting it. Secure RAM Computation. Much like how garbled circuits can be applied to secure circuit computation, so can garbled RAM be used for secure RAM computation. This allows us to perform oneround secure RAM computation in the OT-hybrid model.Our construction permits the secure computation of multiple RAM programs on a persistent database, although we do not allow the inputs to be chosen adaptively by an attacker (a weakness that is present in, and inherited from garbled circuits). Furthermore, we inherit many of the optimizations found in garbled circuits, for example, garbled input in our construction can be compressed from |x| · poly(κ) to |x| + poly(κ) via [AIKW13] .
OUR TECHNIQUES
The starting point for our work is the garbled RAM construction of Lu and Ostrovsky [LO13] . Though the security of this construction is based on a strong and somewhat complex "circular" assumptions involving Yao garbled circuits and PRFs, it serves as a good starting point in explaining the ideas behind our construction based on one-way functions. Starting point -Lu-Ostrovsky construction. The Lu-Ostrovsky construction views the program P , to be garbled, as a sequence of T CPU steps. Each of these CPU steps is represented as a circuit. Each CPU step reads or writes one bit of the RAM, which stores some dataset D. In order to keep this intuitive description simple, we will restrict ourselves to RAM programs that only read from memory and also to the weaker security requirement of unprotected memory access (UMA) in which we do not try to hide the database being stored or the memory locations being acces-sed (only the program and input is hidden). As noted in previous works [LO13, GHL + 14] this weaker security guarantee can be amplified to full security by using oblivious RAM. Garbling the RAM program itself involves just garbling the T CPU step circuits, using a circuit garbling scheme, e.g. Yao [Yao82] . The novelty is the added functionality of the ability to read bits from arbitrary memory locations without knowing them in advance or using interaction.
For each memory location i, containing value bi the encrypted value Fs(i, bi) is stored in the "garbled" memory, where s is a secret PRF key. Let's consider that a CPU step that wants to read memory location i that needs to be fed into the next CPU step. Note that both these circuits will be independently garbled using Yao's garbled circuit technique. Let label 0 and label 1 be the garbled input wire labels corresponding to the wire for the read bit of the second circuit. In order to enable evaluation of the second garbled circuit, we need to be able to reveal exactly one of these two labels, corresponding to bi, to the evaluator. Note that the first garbled circuit needs to do this without knowing i and bi at the time of garbling. The idea for enabling the read is for the first garbled circuit to produce a translation gadget: the first garbled circuit outputs encryptions of labels label 0 and label 1 under keys Fs(i, 0) and Fs(i, 1) respectively. Since the evaluator holding the garbled memory only has one of the two values Fs(i, 0) or Fs(i, 1) at his disposal, he can only obtain either label 0 or label 1 . This enables the evaluator to feed the proper bit into the next CPU step and continue the evaluation. Again we note here that since the location i that needs to be read is generated dynamically at runtime, we need the CPU step to be able to generate PRF values Fs(i, 0) and Fs(i, 1) dynamically, and in order to enable this computation we need to hardwire the secret key s in each of these CPU step circuits that are being garbled. Circularity Assumption. As noted in [GHL + 14], in arguing security of the above scheme we need to rely of the security of Yao's garbled circuit, which in turn needs that only one label for each of its input wires is given out. Finally this needs to rely on the pseudorandomness property of the outputs of F . However the problem is that the key of the PRF s, is embedded inside the garbled circuits. Because of this circularity, the security of this construction requires a somewhat complicated assumption.
Gentry et al. [GHL + 14] propose two solutions to this problem. At a high level, the common idea in the two solutions is to not embed the same PRF key in each CPU step. Instead they consider a sequence of keys of decreasing power that are hardcoded in the CPU steps. Abstractly this sequence of hardcoded keys is such that, a key hardcoded in a circuit can be used to decrypt the input labels for future garbled circuits but not the current and past ones, breaking the circularity. Unfortunately, these solutions either require stronger assumptions, namely IBE [BF01] , or more overhead that do not meet our poly-logarithmic efficiency goals.
There appears to be a fundamental barrier in all previous schemes: to read a value from a memory location, we need to have a key hardcoded in the garbled circuits that produces two values for any memory location, one of which is in the garbled memory. At the same time we need to claim that the value not in memory is indistinguishable for random in order to use Yao's security for the next garbled circuit. Given that we do not want to assume circularity the need to successively weaker keys seems unavoidable. The main technical question is how can we overcome this dependency without necessarily having to weaken keys? Our Idea. Our main idea is to replace the process of key revocation, with the idea of key evolution. Data garbling in previous constructions was done using one master key that encrypted everything, and weakenings of which were hardcoded inside different garbled circuits, in an attempt to break circularity. Our strategy will be to have multiple keys, more explicitly a key tree, and anytime a key is used in a way that might effect the security of the later garbled circuits, then we immediately discard it and replace it with a fresh new key. Of course as a key is removed from the system we need to ensure that no value is encrypted under that key, as those values would become unusable once this key is discarded. Therefore if any value is encrypted under the key being discarder then that value must be first recovered and encrypted under the new key. In order to give a better intuition of this key evolution process we will start by describing how we garble the memory and then explain how this key evolution helps break circularity.
Here is how our memory is garbled: we sample a tree of fresh random keys s i,j ∈ {0, 1} κ where i ∈ {0, . . . d − 1} and j ∈ {0, . . . 2 i − 1} where d = log(m/κ) and m is the size of the database D. The garbled memory itself consists of encryptions of the data under the leaf keys from the key tree and the encryption of each key in the key tree under its parent key. We refer the reader to look at Figure 1 for a graphical representation of the same. Note that given the root key s 0,0 , starting from the root, one can navigate the tree and reach any leaf key s d−1,j with d−1 decryptions, which can be then used to read the desired bit from memory. On the other hand, withholding the root key, renders the entire tree hidden.
As already pointed, having access to the root key enables reading any bit from memory, and this process involves reading a sequence of d − 1 keys from memory. Our idea of key evolution is that in the process of reading a bit from memory we will expunge all the keys along the path from the root to the leaf and replace them with freshly sampled keys. Note that since each key only encrypts two other keys or 2κ bits of memory, it is easy to read those values and output additionally an encryption of these values under the updated key. In other words, as a circuit navigates the tree, it will update all the nodes visited along the path using fresh keys. The additional subtlety here is that, whenever we replace a node with fresh key, then both its children nodes need to be re-encrypted under the fresh key. We believe that this is very novel spin on tree-based constructions in cryptography, e.g. it differs drastically from statistical ORAM [Ajt10, DMN11, SvDS + 13, CP13], Merkle trees [Mer88], GGM PRF [GGM84] and broadcast encryption [FN94] . We expect this to have other applications in cryptography. Now we explain how this key evolution process solves the circularity problem. We note that at any point in time, any key that is ever used to read any other key or data from memory has already been expunged. This allows us to claim the invariant that at point of time the evolved key tree only consists of pristine keys, that have never been used to read anything from memory. This gives the guarantee that future time steps have essentially nothing to do with the keys that were actively used in previous time steps. 1 Finally note that the key evolution only changes the keys in the system but the size of the garbled memory itself does not change. Hence our solution only requires poly(κ) overhead to store the garbed tree and poly(κ, log m) additional overhead in the running time of the CPU circuit, required to navigate the tree achieving the desired efficiency goals.
We note that in the proof various additional subtleties arise. In the life time of a key it might be read and re-encrypted multiple times, depending on the execution path of the program. The invariant above only claims that the key itself was not used to read anything from memory or in other words PRF values were not computed using this key. In the proof before we can rely on the security of PRF for this key we need to replace all the encryptions of this key with encryptions of random strings. We prove that this can indeed be done as all those encryptions are under keys that have already been expunged and so on.
Writing. Unlike previous GRAM schemes, where writing was more involved, our construction achieves writes in a very simple manner. Recall that reading in our scheme already re-encrypts the read data under its new parent. Writing just involves encrypting the value to be written instead of doing the re-encryption.
Decoupling of data garbling and program garbling. A very nice feature of our construction, that enables for various novel applications, is that the only connection between the garbled memory and the garbled program is in terms of the root key which can be fed into the garbled program rather than being hardcoded in it. This means that we can garble the program independent of the data.
Roadmap
We now lay out a roadmap for the remainder of the paper. In Section 3, we give necessary background and definitions for the RAM model, garbled circuits, and garbled RAM. In Section 4 we give the main construction of our result, and prove the security in Section 5 (with the full proof in the full version [GLOS14] ). We refer the reader to the full version [GLOS14] for a survey of other related work and review of Oblivious RAM [GO96] . We also we give a warmup construction of fully secure single-program GRAM from UMA-secure single-program GRAM (such a proof was previously given in [GHL + 14], but given our slightly stronger definitions, we re-prove the result under these stronger conditions) and show how to obtain fully secure multi-program GRAM from UMAsecure multi-program GRAM in the full version [GLOS14] .
BACKGROUND
In this section we fix notation for RAM computation and provide formal definitions for Garbled Circuits and Garbled RAM Programs. Parts of this section are written verbatim from [GHL + 14].
RAM Model
Notation for RAM Computation. We start by fixing the notation for describing standard RAM computation. For a program P with memory of size m we denote the initial contents of the memory data by D ∈ {0, 1} m . Additionally, the program gets a "short" input x ∈ {0, 1} n , which we alternatively think of as the initial state of the program. We use the notation P D (x) to denote the execution of program P with initial memory contents D and input x. The program can P read from and and write to various locations in memory D throughout its execution. 2 We will also consider the case where several different programs are executed sequentially and the memory persists between executions. We denote this as (y1, . . . , y ) = (P1(x1), . . . , P (x )) D to indicate that first P D 1 (x1) is executed, resulting in some memory contents D1 and output y1, then P D 1 2 (x2) is executed resulting in some memory contents D2 and output y2 etc. As an example, imagine that D is a huge database and the programs Pi are database queries that can read and possibly write to the database and are parameterized by some values xi.
2 In general, the distinction between what to include in the program P , the memory data D and the short input x can be somewhat arbitrary. However as motivated by our applications we will typically be interested in a setting where that data D is large while the size of the program |P | and input length n is small. CPU-Step Circuit. Consider a RAM program who execution involves at most T CPU steps. We represent a RAM program P via a sequence of T small CPU-Step Circuit where each of them executes a single CPU step. In this work we will denote one CPU step by:
This circuit takes as input the current CPU state state and a block z read . Looking ahead this block will be read from the memory location that was requested for a memory location requested for in the previous CPU step. The 
Note that in the description above without loss of generality we have made some simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that the output z write is written into the same location z read was read from. Note that this is sufficient to both read from and write to arbitrary memory locations. Secondly we note that we assume that each CPU-step circuit always reads from and write some location in memory. This is easy to implement via a dummy read and write step. Finally, we assume that the instructions of the program itself is hardwired into the CPU-step circuits, and the program can first load itself into memory before execution. In cases where the size of the program vastly differs from its running time, one can suitably partition the program into two pieces.
Representing RAM computation by CPU-Step Circuits. . If τ = T − 1 then we set state to be the output of the program P and ignore the value L τ +1 . Note here that we have without loss of generality assumed that in one step the CPU-Step the same location in memory is read from and written to. This has been done for the sake of simplifying exposition.
Garbled Circuits
Garbled circuits was first constructed by Yao [Yao82] (see Lindell and Pinkas [LP09] and Bellare et al. [BHR12] for a detailed proof and further discussion). A circuit garbling scheme is a tuple of PPT algorithms (GCircuit, Eval). Very roughly GCircuit is the circuit garbling procedure and Eval the corresponding evaluation procedure. Looking ahead, each individual wire w of the circuit will be associated with two labels, namely lab w 0 , lab w 1 . Finally, since one can apply a generic transformation (see, e.g. [AIK10] ) to blind the output, we allow output wires to also have arbitrary labels associated with them. Indeed, we can classify the output values into two categories -plain outputs and labeled outputs. The difference in the two categories stems from how they will be treated when garbled during garbling and evaluation. The plain output values do not require labels provided for them and evaluate to cleartext values. On the other hand labeled output values will require that additional output labels be provided to GCircuit at the time of garbling, and Eval will only return these output labels and not the underlying cleartext. We also define a well-formedness test for labels which we call Test.
•
: GCircuit takes as input a security parameter κ, a circuit C, and a set of labels lab w b for all the output wires w ∈ out(C) and b ∈ {0, 1}. We denote the set of input and output wires by inp(C) and out(C) respectively. This procedure outputs a garbled circuitC and a set of labels lab w b for each input wire w ∈ inp(C) and b ∈ {0, 1}.
• 0/1 ← Test(lab) tests whether a label is well-formed.
• {(w, ow)} w∈out(C) = Eval(C, {(w, lab w xw )} w∈inp(C)
n (here n is the input length to C) we have that that: 
Garbled RAM
Next we consider an extension of garbled circuits to the setting of RAM programs. In this setting the memory data D is garbled once and then many different garbled programs can be executed sequentially with the memory changes persisting from one execution to the next. We will start by presenting our definitions for the case when only one program is garbled and then present the definitions for the case when multiple programs are garbled in the Appendix. Another simplifying assumption we make is that in our definition here, we focus on a weaker variant (that also appeared in [GHL + 14]) known as Unprotected Memory Access (UMA) , and we define full security in the Appendix and show how UMA-secure Garbled RAM can be compiled with Oblivious RAM to achieve full security. Syntax. A UMA-secure single-program garbled RAM scheme consists of four procedures: (GData, GProg, GInput, GEval) with the following syntax:
: Given a security parameter 1 κ and memory D ∈ {0, 1} m as input GData outputs the garbled memoryD.
• (P , s in ) ← GProg(1 κ , 1 log m , 1 t , P ) : Takes the description of a RAM program P with memory-size m as input. It then outputs a garbled programP and an input-garbling-key s in .
•x ← GInput(1 κ , x, s in , s): Takes as input x ∈ {0, 1} n and and an input-garbling-key s in , a garbled "tree root" key s and outputs a garbled-inputx.
• y = GEvalD(P ,x): Takes a garbled programP , garbled inputx and garbled memory dataD and output a value y. We model GEval itself as a RAM program that can read and write to arbitrary locations of its memory initially containing D.
Efficiency. We require the run-time of GProg and GEval to be t · poly(κ) · polylog(m), which also serves as the bound on the size of the garbled programP . Moreover, we require that the run-time of GData should be m · polylog(m) · poly(κ), which also serves as an upper bound on the size ofD. Finally the running time of GInput is required to be n · poly(κ).
Correctness. For correctness, we require that for any program P , initial memory data D ∈ {0, 1} m and input x we have that:
Security with Unprotected Memory Access (UMA). For security, we require that there exists a PPT simulator Sim such that for any program P , initial memory data D ∈ {0, 1} m and input x, which induces access pattern MemAccess we have that:
in , s), and y = P D (x).
THE CONSTRUCTION
In this section we describe our construction for garbled RAM formally, namely the procedures (GData, GProg, GInput, GEval). We use the notation [n] to denote the set {0, . . . , n − 1}. Throughout the construction, we let F : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} κ be a PRF with seed length κ. For any string x we reserve the use of subscript to denote its bit locations. For example for a string x, we use xi to denote the i th bit of x where i ∈ [|x|] with the 0 th bit being the highest order bit.
Data Garbling
We start by providing an informal description of the data garbling procedure. The formal description is provided in Figure 2 . To explain the memory garbling procedure better we provide its graphical representation in Figure 1 . In Figure 1 
Figure 1: Visualization of Memory Garbling.
The GData(1 κ , D) procedure proceeds as follows.
Sample {r
2. Without loss of generality we assume that m = 2 d · κ where d is a positive integer and set m = 2
, where r i,j k denotes the k th bit of r i,j .
OutputD = ({r
) and s = r 0,0 . We also generate encryptions of each key in the tree under its parent. Specifically, each bit of the key r i,j is encrypted under the key r i−1, j/2 . For example in Figure 1 we provide encryptions of r 1,0 and r 1,1 under r 0,0 in yellow color. The garbled memory provided consists of the generated encryptions of the provided keys and the memory.
Program Garbling:
We start by defining three sub-circuits and some notation that will be needed in describing the garbling itself.
Our Sub-Circuits. We use the notation C type [param] to describe a circuit C type that has hardwired parameters param, where type ∈ {nav, step, final} the three types of circuits we will define. These circuits will be referred to as the navigation circuit, the step circuit and the final circuit respectively. Input-output behavior of these circuits. Each one of these three circuits takes as input (x, y, aux), where x, y ∈ {0, 1} κ and aux = (state, L) where state ∈ {0, 1} * and L ∈ {0, 1} d . Looking ahead, x, y denote the 2κ bits just read from garbled memory, state represents the input state of the CPU computation including location L that describes the block of data memory we are currently interested in reading.
The output of C nav and C step consists of (write, translate, aux ). Roughly the output write will consist of information that will enable writing something into memory, translate will consist of values that enable reading from memory and finally aux just describes the output CPU-state including location L that describes the block of data memory we are currently interested in reading. The output of the final circuit C final is just (write, aux). Note that the final circuit is essentially same as the step circuit except the functionality that generates translate has been trimmed. This is depicted in Figure 3 .
Communication between different circuits. Looking ahead, our garbling of a RAM program will consist of garbling of multiple copies of these three circuits instantiated with different parameters hardwired into them. Furthermore we will need this garbling to be such that these garbled circuits can "talk to each other." This communication will be enabled in two ways: 1) We directly pass the output of one circuit into the input of another. This can be achieved by having the first garbled circuit produce as output the labels needed for the inputs of the next garbled circuit. 2) The garbled memory is involved, where in particular, one garbled circuit will output a translation table which will encode pairs of labels for input wires of the second circuit it wants to communicate with. Given this translation table depending on bits stored in the garbled memory the evaluator will be able to obtain exactly 1-out-of-2 of the labels. This will be tantamount to reading from the underlying memory. The translation information corresponds precisely to the translate output of the navigation and the step circuits. More speci-
,b∈{0,1} be the labels for input wires of a circuit with which the circuit at hand is trying to communicate. Since the translation table translate generated by the circuit at hand needs to depend on the labels lab, we will need to hard-code these labels in the circuit being garbled.
We detail the subcircuits in Figure 5 . The process of garbling multiple instances of these circuits and their process of communication will be explained later.
The actual garbling. We now provide an informal description of our RAM garbling procedure. A formal description of GProg is provided in Figure 6 .
As mentioned earlier, garbling a RAM program will require garbling multiple instances of circuits described earlier. Specifically if the running time of the program P being garbled is t and the size of the database is m = m · κ, then the garbled RAM program will consist of t · log m garbled circuits which we can intuitively group into log m garbled circuits for each time step of the program. In particular for each time step we will consider a sequence of log m − 1 instances of C nav followed by one instance of C step . For the last time step we just replace the last C step circuit with C final . Recall that the only difference between C step and C final is that unlike C step , C final does not output any translate information translate.
Now that we have explained the overall structure, we will next describe the role of each of these circuits. It is helpful to keep in mind how the garbled memory is constructed using a tree of keys (cf . Fig 2) . In short, the plain version simply consists of a tree of randomly sampled PRF keys for each non-leaf node, and a κ bit data block from database D for each leaf. The encrypted version of this plain version, which constitutes the actual garbled memory, consists of an encryption of each PRF key under its parent, with the root removed. More specifically, a non-root PRF key (or a database block) r is encrypted as {Fs(left/right, k, r k )} k∈ [κ] , where left/right indicates if the node is a left or right child, s is the PRF key of its parent, and r k is the k th bit of the PRF key (or the database block).
For each step τ ∈ [t] of the computation, the step circuit C step requires a κ-bit block of data from memory at location L. However this is encrypted under a key from level d − 1. This key is itself encrypted under another key from level d − 2 and so on. Hence in order to read the desired memory location, we need to navigate in the memory from level 0 to level d − 1 reading one key at a time and finally recovering the desired data block. This is exactly what will be achieved by a sequence of log m circuits. As we will see next the last of these circuits also performs the computation corresponding to the time step and help kick-start the next computation step. This depicted informally in Figure 4 . More concretely the i th circuit for i ∈ [d] takes as input two sibling PRF keys and uses one among them to decrypt and obtain PRF keys corresponding to its two children, depending on what data block we actually want to read. For example, the 0 th circuit takes as input the PRF keys for the two children of the root. It decrypts the two children of one of these two nodes, depending on what data block from memory is to be read. All the other circuits behave analogously. The last circuit will have the root PRF key embedded in it and this would enable it to read the two children of the root needed for the next log m sequence of garbled circuits needed for the next time step. Additionally for security, each step will also replace each key along the path that has been used to decrypt anything else with a fresh key. The reason for this is that for security we maintain the variant that any PRF key in the system is used at most once for reading anything. So any time a PRF key is used to decrypt its two children then then that PRF key is immediately updated to fresh key.More details on why this is needed will be elaborated on in the proof.
1. Navigation Circuit C nav [r, r , i, lab]: This circuit has hardwired in it PRF keys r and r , value i ∈ [d] and labels
the circuit output is generated as follows.
(a) If Li = 0 then set key = x, newL = r , newR = y else set key = y, newL = x, newR = r and set write := (L, {Fr(left, k, newL k ),
where
(b) Randomly permute the rows of translate and output (write, translate, aux).
2.
Step Circuit C step [r, s, lab]: This circuit has hardwired in it PRF keys r and s and labels lab = {lab
d the circuit output is generated as follows.
(c) Randomly permute the rows of translate and output (write, translate, aux ) where aux := (state , L ).
This circuit is similar to the circuit C step [r, s] but with part of its functionality trimmed. This circuit has hardwired in it PRF keys r. On input
the circuit output is generated as follows. A bit more precisely, we consider the semantics of the circuit C nav [r, r , i, lab](x, y, aux) which will output (write, translate, aux). Here r is a freshly chosen PRF key that will replace either the plain value of the one of the two PRF keys it gets as input, depending on the path we do end up taking, which in turn depends on the memory block we are interested in reading. The PRF key r is the PRF key that replaced the PRF key of the parent of the two nodes in consideration. Since the key of the parent has been updated we need to to re-encrypt the input PRF keys under r. At a high level, in reading some data location L we replace all the keys, along the path in the tree from the root to the leaf, with fresh PRF keys. For consistency this requires that the children of all these nodes corresponding to which keys have have updated be re-encrypted under these fresh keys. Interestingly this includes the siblings that haven't even been used. We stress that even though a priori we do not not know which values in key tree will be replaced with fresh values; we do know that the values they will be replaced with (they are freshly chosen) and these values are what are hardwired into the circuits.
The GProg(1 κ , 1 log m , 1 t , P ) procedure proceeds as follows. All garbled sub-circuits will output write and translate in the clear, so we omit assigning wire labels to them when invoking GCircuit. Given a garbled circuitC τ,i , we parse its input labels
where read corresponds to the inputs x and y.
1. Sample u1 . . . ut ← {0, 1} κ .
2. For each τ ∈ {t − 1, . . . 0} proceed as follows:
(c) For i ∈ {d − 2, . . . , 0}.
We make note of the final root key ut. Finally, we describe the other two circuits C step and C final in terms of how they differ from C nav a bit more. These circuits can be considered as virtual navigate circuits at level d − 1: the input consist of two leaf nodes which correspond to actual memory that can be read from, and it helps in enabling "wrap around." In other words a mechanism that enables reading the PRF keys stored in the two children of the root node. Also, unlike C nav which replaces each key used to read other keys with a fresh key, this circuit executes the underlying CPU step and writes back the block b write . Finally, in order to obtain the translation table, these circuits will be hardwired with the value of the root node. Note that C final is same as C step except that it does not need to provide any "wrap around." Now that we have roughly described the overall structure and the role of each individual circuit in the garbling process we will next describe a bit more precisely how the garbled circuits communicate. This is actually very simple. Each circuitC τ,i passes on its output aux directly as input to the circuitC τ,i+1 if i < d − 1 or to the circuitC i+1,0 otherwise. Similarly the circuitC τ,i provides translation information that enables evaluator of these garbled circuits to read a bit from memory.
Toward capturing this, we use the following notation. We denote the set of all input labels of circuitC τ,i by lab τ,i . Then, within this set we distinguish two kind of labels: namely lab τ,i =
[lab τ,i,read , lab τ,i,aux ], where lab τ,i,read denotes the input labels corresponding to the input values x and y -the values just read from memory and lab τ,i,aux denotes the input labels corresponding to the input aux. Generating the garbled circuitC τ,i+1 requires additionally the information lab τ,i+1 if i < d − 1 and lab τ +1,0 otherwise.
We note that since the generation ofC τ,i+1 depends on labels lab τ,i+1 or lab τ +1,0 , therefore we need to gable these circuits in the opposite order, i.e. garbling the last circuit first. As a result, during garbling we will know ahead of time what the input labels for the next garbled circuit will be.
Input
Garbling:
Informally, the GInput algorithm uses x and s as selection bits for the labels provided by s in and outputsx, which is just the selected labels. A formal description of GProg is provided in Figure 7 .
The algorithm GInput(1 κ , x, s in , s) proceeds as follows. Here = {lab aux,i,x i } i∈inp(state) , {lab aux,i,0 } i∈inp(L) , where these are selected from the full set of labels lab aux = {lab aux,i,b } i∈inp(aux)=inp(state,L),b∈{0,1} . 
Garbled Evaluation: y ← GEvalD(P ,x)
The GEval procedure gets as input the garbled databaseD = ({r i,j,k } i∈ ). Intuitively the GEval is very simple. It proceeds by executing the sequence of garbled programs in the prescribed order. The labels needed to evaluate the first garbled circuit are provided as part of the garbled input and each evaluation of a garbled circuit reveals the labels needed for the next circuit. Evaluation of each garbled circuit also generates additional values for writing into memory and translation tables for reading values from memory. These are also carried out in the natural manner.
Next we provide the formal description GEval. We will define a function DeTranslate(translate, {r left,k ,r right,k } k∈ [κ] ,C) that un-blinds the labels one at a time. (C, (yi, b, α right,k,b ⊕r right,k )) = 1 then we set β right,k = α right,k,b ⊕r right,k . A formal description of GProg is provided in Figure 8 .
The algorithm GEvalD(P ,x) proceeds as follows. 
SECURITY PROOF
In this section we prove the UMA-security of the garbled RAM (GData, GProg, GInput, GEval) shown in Sec. 4. THEOREM 5.1 (UMA-SECURITY). Given any one-way function (OWF) and a secure garbling scheme (which can be built from the OWF), our construction is a UMA (unprotected memory access) secure garbled RAM scheme.
This can be extended to the following corollary and we give the details in the full version [GLOS14] . COROLLARY 5.2. Assume one-way functions exist, then a fully secure multi-program GRAM scheme exists.
Proof Sketch: We now sketch a proof of Theorem 5.1 and give the full proof in [GLOS14] .
We construct a simulator Sim that produces simulated garbled circuits starting from the last circuit. It proceeds by generating a random-looking output for eachC τ,i by setting translate to be a random key XORed with the corresponding input labels ofC τ,i+1
(since we are working backwards, these labels have already been generated), and similarly using random values for write. The main idea is that we perform bookkeeping to keep track of these random values, so that when we simulate the garbled database, we setD to be uniformly random subject to matching the bookkeeping: since the UMA-simulator gets the full access pattern, it knows exactly which locations in memory it should set entries so that they match what was used to mask the translation table.
Then in order to argue that the simulated output is indistinguishable from the real distribution, we define a sequence of hybrids H 0,0 , H 
